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I INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand's Court of Appeal recently considered important questions 
concerning the status of the Rylands v Fletcher1 rule in Autex Industries Ltd v Auckland 
City Council2 and Hamilton v Papakura District Council. 3 These cases identified fact 
scenarios resembling Rylands situations. Following decisions of the High Court of 
Australia in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltrf and the House of Lords in 
Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Leather Plc, 5 placing Rylands into negligence and 
nuisance categories respectively, the Court of Appeal's approach was eagerly anticipated. 
Of importance, is a careful consideration of the two cases, identifying the reasoning and 
policy underpinning the judgments. Therefore, the predominant focus incorporates an in-
depth discussion of Burnie illustrating judicial alternatives available in analysing one-off 
damaging events, accompanied by an appropriate reflection on the application of such 
arguments to New Zealand's jurisprudential environment. The fundamental flaws 
associated with Rylands and its nuisance rationalisation, results in the argument that 
classifying the doctrine as negligence presents a better option. To provide this answer, 
this paper will identify and consider a number of integral Rylands issues including 'non-
natural use', foreseeability, and defences. In combination, these factors suggest that 
negligence should control this area of liability. 
1 Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 (HL (Eng). 
2 Autex Industries Ltd v Auckland City Council [2000] NZAR 324 (CA). 
3 Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2000] 1 NZLR 265 (CA). 
4 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42; 179 CLR 520 (HCA). 
5 Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather Pie [1994] 2 AC 264 (HL (Eng). 
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II RYLANDS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
On December 11, 1860, a newly excavated Lancashire reservoir, being filled for 
the first time, burst as disused mine shafts underneath failed to hold the weight. These 
shafts connected directly to the adjacent Red House Colliery, and the escaping water 
flooded the entire workings.6 From those facts, Blackburn J delivered the initial 
judgment of Fletcher v Rylands, imparting the Rylands principle; the "true rule of law":7 
[T]he person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there 
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not 
do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its 
escape. 
This principle, coupled with meanings deduced from it and subsequent additions to it, 
constitutes the question guiding this paper. This principle and its manifestations resulted 
in the House of Lords identifying the doctrine with the law of nuisance, and it is equally 
this principle and additions that allowed the High Court of Australia to conclude that 
negligence subsumed the doctrine. The United States adapted the doctrine to develop a 
strict liability doctrine for conveyance, possession, maintenance, and use of "ultra-
hazardous" goods and activities,8 and it is the same doctrine that Canadian Courts often 
ignore in favour of ordinary nuisance or negligence principles. 9 Recent New Zealand 
treatment places Rylands as a strict liability doctrine within nuisance. Evidently, Rylands 
v Fletcher arouses great passion within individuals; great tort writers often commented 
6 A W B Simpson "Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs : The Historical Context of Rylands v Fletcher" 
(1984) XIII The Journal of Legal Studies 209, 212-213. 
7 Fletcher v Rylands and Harrocks (1866) LR 1 Ex 265 , 279-280 (Ex Ch) . 
8 American Law Institute Restatement (Second) of Torts ( 1977) § 519 and § 520. 
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upon it, either loving it or loathing it. Sir Frederick Pollock, ostensibly, was troubled by 
the doctrine. Like many, the original (strict liability) conception was enticing, but 
subsequent alterations and explanations aroused his disdain, resulting in a comment that 
Rylands was one of those authorities "that are followed only in the letter, and become 
slowly but surely choked and crippled by [judicially imposed] exceptions" .10 Pollock 
also determined that the doctrine was "anomalous" .11 These comments possessed 
incredible insight, receiving publication over 100 years ago. Therefore, marked 
disagreement exists among common law countries as to the appropriate classification of 
Rylands. This paper seeks to rationalise the most appropriate approach for New Zealand. 
III THE RECENT NEW ZEALAND APPROACH 
A Autex Industries Ltd v Auckland City Council 
Factually, Autex is simple. An Auckland City Council water mam burst 
approximately eight metres from Autex' s premises. The water caused substantial damage 
to premises, equipment, and stock totalling $206,780.17. Autex sought summary 
judgment on two grounds, namely strict liability for the escape of water under Rylands, 
and negligence in allowing the escape. For the Rylands action, the direct Court of Appeal 
precedent of Irvine and Co Ltd v Dunedin City Corporation 12 concerned a similar escape 
of water. The City Corporation was held strictly liable, and the decision stood 
unchallenged for sixty years. Master Kennedy-Grant removed the application for 
9 Tock v St John 's Metropolitan Area Board (1989) 64 DLR (4th) 620 (SCC) ; Ratko v Public Utility 
Commission of City of Woodstock (1994) 111 DLR (4th) 375 (Ont Divisional Ct); and Smith Eros 
Excavating Windsor Ltd v Price Waterhouse Ltd (1994) Ont CJ Lexis 1486 (Ont CJ). 
10 Quoted in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pry Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 57 (HCA), but deriving 
from Sir Frederick Pollock The Law of Fraud, Misrepresentation and Mistake in British India (1894) 
54. 
11 Sir Frederick Pollock The Law a/Torts (l st ed, Stevens & Sons Ltd, London, 1888) 398. 
12 Irvine and Co Ltd v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZLR 741 (CA). 
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summary judgment to the Court of Appeal, accepting that Irvine bound the High Court. 
Master Kennedy-Grant believed it appropriate that with recent commonwealth 
developments concerning Rylands, and the challenge to the previously undisputed Irvine, 
the case should be considered at the highest level. 13 
The five-member bench provided a three to two judgment. However, the split 
concerned a disagreement as to procedure, rather than the status of Rylands. The 
majority, 14 it would seem, concentrated on the fact that additional evidence was available 
(which could support establishing foreseeability), highlighting (and ultimately deciding) 
that such significant and important contentions deserved full legal arguments before a 
final resolution by the Court. 15 The predominant issue was that the Council sought to 
introduce extra affidavit evidence to support its defence. The Court exercised its residual 
discretion under R 136 of the High Court Rules, remitting the case for High Court trial. 16 
Blanchard and Keith JJ's strong minority judgment determined that the plaintiff 
was entitled to summary judgment. The judgment noted the historical position of the 
Rylands doctrine, and considered whether common bulk conveyance by Councils of 
water, gas, or electricity could be considered a natural use of land. Upon determining 
that, as a matter of law, bulk conveyance was a non-natural use of land, they considered 
the status of Rylands. The minority stated that no tenable argument existed to require 
Rylands to be incorporated into negligence, and that the doctrine was simply a 
particularity of nuisance relating to isolated escapes. They affirmatively cited Cambridge 
113 Autex Industries Ltd v Auckland City Council [2000] NZAR 324, 327 (CA). 
14 The majority constituted Richardson P, Gault and Henry JJ. 
15 Autex Industries Ltdv Auckland City Council [2000] NZAR 324, 329 (CA). 
16 See Ursula Cheer "Whither Rylands v Fletcher" (1998) NZLJ 344 and her discussion about the 
uniqueness of this decision, as the restricted grounds for this discretion usually include the unusualness 
of the features of the case that would make summary judgment unfair or unjust, and where there are 
complex questions of fact and Jaw. Deciding on the basis of important and significant features of these 
profound and far-reaching questions of fact and Jaw is unprecedented. 
/ 
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Water. 17 However, they briefly considered the implications of Burnie, noting especially 
that the High Court majority "left the door open for the continued application of the law 
of nuisance in appropriate cases" .18 The minority identified certain policy reasons in 
favour of maintaining the status quo. These arguments included a cost-benefit insurance 
analysis so favoured by American jurisprudence, noting that: 19 
The risk of calamitous loss to a neighbour, who is necessarily unable to forestall an 
escape occurring on adjacent property .. .is spread amongst all ratepayers or borne by the 
local authority's public liability underwriter. Such a rule ... protects those who may not 
be able to obtain insurance .. .It also minimises any doubling up of insurance premiums. 
The dissent also noted the lack of clear justifications for replacing Rylands uncertainties 
with negligence uncertainties, including the fact that negligence "can provide no 
guarantee of recovery ... ",20 and they were evidently persuaded by Professor Flerning's 
view that Rylands was a vital component of tort theory. Upon those considerations, the 
minority entered the summary judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of their claim, 
holding simply that Rylands was not part of negligence. 
Following Autex Industries, a certain degree of uncertainty surrounded the rule's 
status, for no definitive answer was provided, although the minority's argument seemed 
strong. Vennell argues that Autex Industries indicates that if the appropriate case came 
before the Court where the question was fully argued, 'Rylands v Fletcher might still 
have a life here' .21 With due respect, Autex presented the Court with an opportunity to 
lay the modern foundation for the direction of Rylands. The facts represent classic 
17 Autex Industries Ltd v Auckland City Council (2000) NZAR 324, 327 (CA). 
18 Autex Industries Ltd v Auckland City Council (2000) NZAR 324, 335 (CA) Keith and Blanchard JJ, 
identified from Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 58 (HCA). 
19 Autex Industries Ltd v Auckland City Council (2000) NZAR 324, 335 (CA) Keith and Blanchard JJ. 
20 Autex Industries Ltd v Auckland City Council [2000] NZAR 324, 335 (CA) Keith and Blanchard JJ. 
21 Margaret Vennell "Rylands v Fletcher in New Zealand" (2000) NZLJ 33. 
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Rylands, and for the full bench of the Court of Appeal to not at least indicate the 
appropriate direction for Rylands, it seems difficult to argue, with any certainty, what a 
Court would decide. However, it is worth noting that the minority's determinant factors 
lack real punch in terms of concluding that nuisance is the better way. This will be 
explored later. 
B Hamilton v Papakura District Council 
The second important case is Hamilton v Papakura District Council. The basic 
allegation was that the plaintiff's hydroponically grown tomatoes were damaged due to 
the contamination by herbicide residues of local water supplies. The water remained safe 
for general purposes (including drinking) but it was argued that the level of contamination 
was toxic to these plants. After extensive evidence, the trial judge concluded on the 
balance of probabilities that the contamination level was, at no relevant time, sufficient to 
cause damage to the plants. Nuisance, negligence, and Rylands v Fletcher were among 
the Hamiltons ' numerous causes of actions. Gault J, delivering the Court's judgment,22 
held that Rylands was a subset of nuisance law, and that as foreseeability of harm was a 
private nuisance damage prerequisite, then it was similarly a prerequisite for Rylands 
liability. Quite unbelievably, the Court failed to mention yet alone consider the 
Australian approach of Burnie. Of interest, was Gault J's discussion of this 
foreseeability, especially in his designation that strict liability foreseeability was no 
different to that required within negligence liability.23 
22 Only a 3-member bench this time, including Gault, McGechan, and Paterson JJ. 
23 Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2000] 1 NZLR 265 , 283-284 (CA). See also Stephen Todd 
"Review: Tort" (2000) NZ Law Rev 505 , 520. 
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Thus, the New Zealand Court of Appeal decided to position Rylands as a separate 
nuisance subset. However, in doing so, there was an incredibly minute discussion about 
the implications and conceptual underpinnings of such a decision. Surprisingly, the 
interesting judgment of Burnie received transitory treatment in the Court of Appeal.
24 
The Court considered the doctrine firmly entrenched in nuisance, with foreseeability as a 
clear prerequisite for such strict liability (perhaps then, the better description should be 
'stricter' liability), drawing from the judgment of Lord Goff in Cambridge Water. 
25 Still, 
numerous concerns surround such a classification. With all due respect, a definitive 
statement of law must be defensible by discernible legal reasoning and criteria, and the 
Court of Appeal failed on all counts. In simply stating that Rylands is a special set of 
nuisance, the Court has not assisted comprehensive and comprehensible legal 
development. In reading the Autex minority, and the Hamilton judgments, readers 
seeking meaning are provided with few answers. Also, surprisingly, given the 
importance of these issues, remarkably little academic discussion concerns the 
appropriate direction.26 Implicit flaws in both nuisance and Rylands exist, and true 
concerns arise in conceptualising the answer to one-off damaging events from escape as 
nuisance. These flaws constituted the key concern identified by the majority in Burnie. 
Further confusion derives from Gault J correctly determining that no difference exists 
between the foreseeability requirements in negligence and the standard adopted by Lord 
Goff in Cambridge Water. There can only be one foreseeability test, but that provides no 
24 Autex Industries Ltd v Auckland City Council [2000] NZAR 324, 327, 330, 335 (CA). 
25 Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2000] 1 NZLR 265, 283 (CA). 
26 Stephen Todd "Review: Tort" (2000) NZ L Rev 505; John Smillie "The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher" in 
Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (3 ed, Wellington, Brookers, 2001) 554; Ursula 
Cheer "Whither Rylands v Fletcher" (1998) NZLJ 344; Margaret Vennell "Rylands v Fletcher in New 
Zealand" (2000) NZLJ 33; and to a limited extent Bruce Pardy "Fault and Cause: Rethinking the Role 
of Negligent Conduct" (1995) TLR 143. 
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overwhelming rationale for placing Rylands in the nuisance context; if anything, it makes 
Rylands increasingly similar to negligence. 
IV THE BURNIE JUDGMENTS 
Burnie also concerns a relatively simple fact scenario. General Jones Pty Ltd used 
cool stores owned by Burnie Port Authority (Burnie Port) for the storage of frozen 
vegetables. Burnie Port was conducting a large renovation and extension project to their 
existing premises. One aspect involved the installation of refrigeration equipment, which 
was entrusted to independent contractor Wildridge & Sinclair Pty Ltd (the contractor). 
The contractor's work included substantial welding, and the installation of expanded 
polystyrene (EPS), an insulating material called 'Isolite'. While inclusive of fire retardant 
chemicals, sustained contact with a flame or burning substance can cause ignition, which 
causes dissolution into liquid fire, "burn[ing] with extraordinary ferocity, at a rate which 
increases in geometric progression".27 The contractor purportedly stacked cardboard 
boxes containing 'Isolite' in a roofed area, in close proximity to where they were 
concurrently conducting extensive welding activities. At all times, Burnie Port continued 
occupation of the premises, and was aware of the contractor's stacking of the boxes. The 
trial judge (Neasey J) determined that the contractor's employees conducted the welding 
in such negligent fashion as to cause, by spark or molten metal falling onto one or more 
of the cardboard boxes, ignition of the 'Isolite' and incineration of the entire Burnie Port 
complex, including those formerly frozen vegetables of General Jones. General Jones 
sued both Burnie Port and the contractor for damages totalling $2.246 million. 
27 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 44 (HCA) 
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Neasey J considered Burnie Port liable through the ancient ignis suus rule. The 
ignis suus doctrine states: 28 
[A]n occupier of land is liable for damage caused by the spread of fire from his land 
caused by the negligence of his independent contractor. 
The Judge rejected the claim against Burnie Port under Rylands, as welding was not a 
'non-natural use' of the premises, and negligence was unfounded. The Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of Tasmania, on appeal, held that ignis suus was absorbed (in Australia) 
by Rylands. Liability arose from the application of Rylands, predominantly through 
determining that welding was a 'non-natural use' . Burnie Port appealed to the High 
Court of Australia. General Jones' representatives submitted for liability under ignis 
suus, Rylands v Fletcher, and negligence. 
A full seven-member High Court bench considered the case. A 5-2 majority 
determined that the rule in Rylands, as a separate doctrine, did not represent the law of 
Australia and had been incorporated into the law of negligence.29 The attack on Rylands 
v Fletcher was rather unforeseen, perhaps partly due to the relatively small number of 
cases that enter the Courts, and further still, reach the highest courts. Of the two 
dissentingjudgments ofMcHugh and Brennan JJ, McHugh J's discussion predominantly 
considered the Rylands issue. 30 
28 This constitutes a slight modification to the original strict liability rule as identified in the 1401 case of 
Beaulieu v Finglam (1401) YB 2 HEN IV, f 18, pi 6, which steadfastly constrained the rule ' s 
application to an occupier's fire. Lord Denning MR revisited the rule in H & N Emanuel Ltd v Greater 
London Council [1971] 2 All ER 835 (CA), extending its application to include any fire that escapes 
from the occupier' s land due to the negligence of any person under the control of the occupier. A 
stranger' s negligence provides the only defence. 
29 The majority included Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, and Gauldron JJ . Brennan and McHugh JJ 
dissented. 
30 The Full Court unanimously held that the ignis suus rule was absorbed by Rylands v Fletcher. Therefore, 
the majority also must impliedly hold that ignis suus is absorbed by negligence. 
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V THE MAJORITY'S CONCERNS 
A The Trend to Negligence 
Thus, the majority's novel journey attempted to rationalise and reconcile Rylands. 
Sceptics will disregard this approach as 'excessive' judicial activism, but rather the Court 
should be hailed for being prepared to question the underpinnings of the doctrine. In 
questioning the true meaning of Rylands, the Court justifiably determined that Rylands 
increasingly reflected negligence due to continued judicial interference. The majority 
discusses three illustrations of the trend towards negligence. First, the criteria for 
determining 'non-natural' use of land are nearly, if not wholly, irreconcilable, and 
negligence criteria including the absence of reasonable care has intruded as a common 
element in answering whether the use of the land was 'non-natural' ( or the fashionable 
epithet).31 The original qualification of "which he knows to be mischievous" manifested 
into an objective test resembling foreseeability. The introduction of the notion of 
'danger' in the context of dangerousness or dangerous necessarily imports foreseeability 
criteria. Todd recognises that the New Zealand Court of Appeal accepted that this 
foreseeability element did not differ from the negligence standard. 32 It is noteworthy that 
Rylands defences align closely with those acceptable under negligence. Defences 
including "consequence of vis major33 or the act of God" represent fault liability, rather 
than strict liability .34 A true strict liability doctrine would (although harshly) impart 
liability simply because the act occurred: see Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd v 
31 Perhaps the best example is from Blake v Woolf[l898] 2 QB 426, 428, Wright J, see the required use of 
land section later. 
32 Stephen Todd "Review: Tort" (2000) NZLR 505, 516. 
33 A successful case for the vis major defence was Carstairs v Taylor ( 1871) LR 6 Ex 217 (Ex Ch). 
34 Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 (PC). 
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National Rivers Authority.35 The majority acknowledged that the recognised Rylands 
defences of 'consent' and 'default of the plaintiff were analogous to the "voluntary 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence". 36 
The majority expressed widespread concern about the Rylands rule, 
predominantly focusing on 'non-natural use', foreseeability, and the Rylands defences. 
These concerns enabled the majority of the High Court to state that: 37 
[T]he subsequent judicial alterations and qualifications. . .of the 'true rule' have 
introduced and exacerbated uncertainties about its content and application. 
They questioned the validity and conception of the 'true rule of law' expounded by 
Blackburn J, noting that "subsequent judicial explanations and qualifications" had all but 
obliterated the identified imperative.38 Specific concerns included "for his own purposes" 
and its effect alongside "natural use", the ownership implication of "his" in the phrase 
"his lands", and in turn, the implicit limitations of "lands" combined with "escapes". 
Further concern surrounded "anything likely to do mischief', and the width of "all the 
damage which is the natural consequence of its escape". The majority noted that 
Blackburn immediately qualified the scope of the "true rule" through including the 
excuses regarding the fault of another or an act of God. However, more important 
qualifications, in the strict liability sense,39 derive from the inclusion of the moderator: 
"was not naturally there ... but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his 
35 Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltdv National Rivers Authority [1999] 2 AC 22 (HL (Eng). 
36 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 58 (HCA). 
37 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 52 (HCA). 
38 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 50 (HCA). 
39 It is important to realise that the traditional English conception of strict liability is more akin to New 
Zealand's understanding of absolute liability; that is once the act has occurred, there is liability for the 
damage. New Zealand's concept of strict liability, including some element of foreseeability, allows 
some excuses. 
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neighbour's [property]". Great disquiet derived from the fact that even this basic notion 
no longer existed, effectively displaced by continual adaptation and qualification of the 
original concept. 
The majority then posed the inevitable question, should negligence absorb the 
special Rylands rule? In favour of subsuming the rule, they repeated five factors 
including: a) Rylands was never the exclusive determinant of liability, b) ordinary 
negligence overlays the entire area, c) the rule's uncertainties, d) application difficulties, 
and e) the Courts reluctance to accept and apply it.40 The majority believed it prudent to 
recognise certain distinctions were unreasonably arbitrary, while noting that the 
predominant argument for retaining the rule as an independent tort was that ordinary 
negligence could not accommodate the doctrine without denying liability in situations 
"where it would otherwise exist".41 In determining the appropriate balance, the majority 
considered it necessary to take an expansive view of the rule to include any dangerous 
substance under the defendant's control, and concluded that these factors balanced in 
favour of applying negligence liability. 
Therefore, the majority were seriously concerned about the condition of the 
Rylands doctrine. The basic premise for this paper originates directly from the majority's 
reasoning; simply, Rylands is in such a confused state that no succinct body of applicable 
law could develop from it, and thus, it cannot remain a separate recognised doctrine. 
40 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 60 (HCA). 
41 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 61 (HCA). 
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VI CONFUSION WITH THE REQUIRED USE OF LAND - 'NON-NATURAL 
USE' 
The majority in Burnie commenced the investigation by tracing through major 
judicial alterations and additions to the Rylands doctrine. The primary inquiry considered 
Lord Cairns LC's conversion of "which was not naturally there" to 'non-natural use'. It 
is noteworthy that Lord Cairns LC entirely concurred with Blackburn J's "true rule".42 
Thus, while noting that this change may have been inadvertently effected, the majority 
also noted the vast conceptual disparity. Blackburn J's 'not naturally there' incorporates 
the introduction of foreign objects onto land, further explained through "brings on his 
lands", and thus, the notion of 'non-natural use' is poles apart for its predominant focus is 
the nature of the use. Blackburn J's original terminology is often quoted, but the focus 
then moves to an inquiry into the type of use. One might argue that Lord Cairns merely 
referred to the use of land other than in its natural state, but subsequent judgments have 
developed a much wider understanding. Lord Moulton, for example, in the Privy Council 
case of Rickards v Lothian,43 focused on the use of the land, introducing such 
characterisations as "special use" increasing the danger to others and "not. .. ordinary", 
when contrasted to "the ordinary use of the land".44 In the controversial case of Read v J 
Lyons & Co Ltd,45 all three notions of the land's use received consideration, while 
Viscount Simon introduced yet another epithet; "exceptional" use. 46 Further epithets, 
including 'dangerous' activity, have been bandied about. For example, the United States 
42 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 51-52 (HCA) . 
43 Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 (PC), ironically, an Australian case on appeal from the High Court of 
Australia, concerned the escape of water from a water basin in a building's toilet facilities, which had 
been blocked by an unidentified malicious third party. The resulting flood caused water damage to a 
business below. 
44 Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 , 280 (PC). 
45 ReadvJ Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] AC 156 (HL (Eng). 
46 See Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] AC 156, 169-170 (HL (Eng) Viscount Simon. 
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Rylands conception, developed through the leadingjudgment of Siegler v Kuhlman,47 and 
stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, defines the governing notion as liability for 
'ultra-hazardous activities' .48 
Thus, in a short period of time, it seems to have become impossible to rationalise 
any bright-line understanding of what 'use of land' is required. Furthermore, the actual 
focus dramatically materialised from the original concentration on what was naturally on 
the land and that introduced, to the inherently challenging and dissimilar focus on land 
use deemed special or exceptional. In reality, such inconsistency in legal doctrine is 
unacceptable, but still Courts continue to persist with Rylands. However, the criticism of 
the "true rule" is not solely the domain of the Burnie majority, arousing much debate and 
contention ever since Blackburn J's provision of the original Fletcher v Rylands. With 
respect, the doctrine received its first "mortal blow"49 through the various transformations 
exacted by Lord Cairns' judgment in Rylands v Fletcher itself. The 'giant' has been 
increasingly crippled by each new judicial explanation, and this motivated the learned 
Court to conclude that Rylands was irreconcilable in application, but reconcilable with 
negligence. 50 Early decisions seemed happy to accept this approach to Rylands. Perhaps 
the best example is from Blake v Woolf, 51 where Wright J explained that a natural use of 
47 Siegler v Kuhlman (1973) 502 P 2d 1181 (Wash). 
48 American Law Institute Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) § 519 and § 520. There is also reference to 
abnormally dangerous activities. The determination of abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous 
concerns the following factors(§ 520): 
(a) existence of a high degree ofrisk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
( e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on and; 
(f) ex1ent to which its value to the community is ourweighed by its dangerous attributes. 
49 Jane Swanton "Case Note: ' Another Conquest in the Imperial Expansion of the Law of Negligence': 
Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltcf' (1994) 2 TLJ 1. 
50 See John G Fleming "The Fall of the Crippled Giant" (1995) TLR 56. 
51 Blake v Woolf[l 898] 2 QB 426, Wright J. 
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land was adjudged by "an ordinary and reasonable user of . .. premises".
52 It is obvious 
that this is classic negligence phraseology, highlighting the closeness of Rylands and 
negligence. 
The majority discussed the controversial ruling in Read v Lyons, and its particular 
relevance to the 'non-natural use' inquiry.53 The House of Lords determined that the 
explosion of a shell causing injury to the plaintiff on the defendant ' s land could not 
establish Rylands liability.54 The decision is, in fact, correct for there was no escape to 
neighbouring land. However, controversy surrounds the indication that the manufacture 
of shells during the war could be a natural or ordinary use of land, outside the scope of 
the Rylands rule. With respect to the House of Lords, consistent development of the 
Rylands doctrine demanded that the House find the manufacture of shells to be a 'non-
natural use' . While the High Court acknowledged that this was an extreme case, it clearly 
canvassed the problems associated with the Rylands doctrine.
55 
Recent decisions indicate a return to the 'natural '/'non-natural ' distinction. Lord 
Goff's detailed and lengthy Cambridge Water judgment signals one such indication, as 
his focus concerned whether the defendant' s use of the land (the use of the solvent 
perchloroethene to degrease pelts) was natural. Without deciding the point, Lord Goff 
stated that he was: 56 
52 Blake v Woolf[l 898] 2 QB 426, 428, Wright J. 
53 Readv J Lyons & Co Ltd (1947] AC 156. 
54 In fact, Lord Macmillan indicated that the case required the pleading of negligence, see Read v J Lyons & 
Co Ltd [1947] AC 156, 174 (HL (Eng) Lord Macmillan. 
55 Under the section of 'Limitations to the Scope of the Rule', several New Zealand cases highlight this 
same problem, see Russell v McCabe [1961] NZLR 392 (CA); Eriksen v Clifton [1963] NZLR 705 
(SC); and New Zealand Forest Products v O 'Sullivan [1974] 2 NZLR 80 (SC). 
56 Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather Pie [1994] 2 AC 264, 282 (HL (Eng) Lord Goff. 
satisfied that the storage of chemicals in substantial quantities, and their use in the manner 
employed at [the tannery's] premises, cannot fall within the exception ... [I]t would not be 
right in such circumstances to exempt [the tannery] from liability .. . on the ground that the 
use was natural or ordinary. 
16 
Lord Goff focuses more on Lord Moulton's "special use" definition, rather than the 
modem qualifications. By Lord Moulton's definition, the inquiry embraces natural and 
ordinary use of land.57 One telling comment referring to the original 'non-natural' 
definitions indicates:58 
[T]he law has long since departed from any such simple idea, redolent of a different age. 
In signalling such an approach, Lord Goff strongly criticised the proposed extension to 
the 'non-natural use' 'test' to include a community benefit test (consideration of 
beneficial employment), rationalising that the test focused on land use alone, whether 
ordinary or natural. Thus, modem considerations of the 'non-natural' inquiry seem to 
recognise that the continued alteration and modem development of the test renders it 
extremely difficult to apply, but still confusion exists as to which test applies. Without 
reverting to the original Rylands definitions, there is the inevitable inclusion within the 
test for the required use of land of foreseeability questions, closely aligning with a 
negligence focus. The Burnie majority, in considering the suitable test, clearly struggled 
to identify the appropriate designation. 
The majority struggled further to reconcile the "critical obscurity" stimulated by 
the duality of 'dangerous substance' and 'non-natural use'. They highlighted the 
absurdity of these binary requirements by stating that:59 
57 Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather Plc [1994] 2 AC 264, 281 (HL (Eng) Lord Goff. 
58 Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather Pie [1994] 2 AC 264, 281 (HL (Eng) Lord Goff. 
Far from representing a unifying principle and a general conceptual explanation and 
determinant of different categories of case, it has, in combination with the associated (and 
often confused) requirement of dangerousness, become a source of disunity and disparity 
within the individual category. Thus, the introduction to or retention on land of trees, 
water, gas, electricity, fire and high explosives, amongst other things, have all been seen, 
as a result of the application of the test to the particular circumstances, as both attracting 
and not attracting the operation of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. (emphasis in case) 
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Thus, "if ... water can be a dangerous substance for the purposes of the rule, it is difficult 
to identify anything, which, accumulated either in sufficient quantity or under sufficient 
pressure, might not be a dangerous substance".60 In fact, this represents the exact 
formation of the rule utilised in Autex; it was the quantity and inherent risk of the bulk 
conveyance that allowed the 'non-natural use' designation. Therefore, very few 
substances or activities could ever be considered not dangerous. While this classification 
often represents the distinguishing feature between simple private nuisance and Rylands, 
this specific point of distinction seems arbitrary and irrelevant, especially within the 
guiding notion of one-off damaging events. Identifying the inherent risk of a substance 
categorically points to foreseeability and negligence considerations. Justice Brennan's 
dissent appears to formulate a response to this concern, by declaring that "[t]he fact that a 
use is dangerous is an indication that it is non-natural". 61 With due respect, Brennan J's 
statement is an incorrect generalisation, with regards to the original conception of the 
rule. While it is arguable that dangerous activities equate with 'non-natural use', as 
Brennan J suggests, this formulation of the rule is too exclusionary, and the dual inquiry 
problem continues, as it include elements of negligence. As Blackbum J focused on that 
"not naturally there", harmless introduced substances, and naturally accumulating 
substances (both dangerous or not) are similarly excluded from the rule, due to the 
59 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 57 (HCA). 
60 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 52 (HCA). 
61 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 76 (HCA) Brennan J. 
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investigation for foreseeability. Furthermore, Lord Moulton's definition in Rickards v 
Lothian highlighted this important consideration, by indicating, "[I]t is not every use of 
land that brings into play [the principle in Rylands v Fletcher]". 62 
A New Zealand's Position 
Thus, does this concern regarding the required use of land exist in New Zealand? 
New Zealand has a long history considering the Rylands doctrine, often concerning fire 
escape. However, New Zealand does, in fact, share similar problems defining 'non-
natural use'. In the previous leading case of Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation,
63 the 
five-member Court of Appeal presented individual opinions. Four of the five judges 
considered Rylands v Fletcher. 64 'Non-natural use' received various judicial descriptions. 
Chief Justice Meyers concluded that it constituted some form of "dangerous use",
65 
Justice Smith conceived it as a "non-natural or extraordinary user of the land",
66 while 
Justice Johnston cited the "special use bringing with it increased danger to others" 
explanation.67 The Supreme Court in Mackenzie v Sloss68 carefully defined the concept 
as ordinary or natural use, but then proceeded to explain further by quoting Lord Moulton 
and Justice Johnston's conception of "special use". 69 Mahon J reconsidered the cause of 
action in New Zealand Forest Products v O 'Sullivan,70 providing a vastly confusing array 
of descriptions of 'non-natural use', including "dangerous element", "proper use of land", 
"exceptional danger", and "special use fraught with risks of damage". The Autex 
62 Rickards v Lothian [1913) AC 263,280 (PC) Lord Moulton. 
63 Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZLR 741 (CA). 
64 Justice Fair answered the case on the statute alone, and Justice Ostler dissented. 
65 Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZLR 741, 759 (CA) Meyers CJ. 
66 Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZLR 741, 775 (CA) Smith J. 
67 Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZLR 741, 790 (CA) Johnston J. 
68 Mackenzie v Sloss [1959] NZLR 533 (SC). 
69 Mackenzie v Sloss [1959] NZLR 533, 538 (SC) McGregor J. 
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minority generally focused on "natural use", equating it, following Lord Goff in 
Cambridge Water, with "ordinary use". However, they largely eliminated references to 
any contrary authority on the meaning of use. In essence, they really fail to provide an 
answer to the question, almost answering it off-the-cuff, with reference to nuisance, and 
the Canadian approach. However, they use Lord Wright's quote from Collingwood v 
Home and Colonial Stores Limited, 71 which indicates that bulk conveyance is a dangerous 
use due to the inherent danger. The minority concentrated on the nature and quantity of 
the bulk conveyance of water, holding that those factors rendered the conveyance non-
natural.72 No definitive answer as to what regulates Rylands derives from Autex. 
Although there is very little discussion of the elementary boundaries of Rylands in 
Hamilton v Papakura District Council, there is at least one reference to "reasonable use". 
Evidently, the New Zealand test incorporates this "critical obscurity" by including 
both 'non-natural' and 'dangerousness', similar to Brennan J' s position above. 
Interestingly, the New Zealand judicial approach endeavours to reconcile the two 
concepts as one. This is inadequate, for asking the question of dangerous non-natural use 
is, in effect, the same as a foreseeability test. For example, the Autex minority 
concentrates on the inherent risk (the danger) in bulk conveyance of water; this mirrors 
the foreseeability requirement in negligence, but negligence avoids the artificiality of the 
determination as to land use. The Autex minority fail to separate the inquiry into the 
respective facets of non-natural use, and then dangerous substance; use should be 
70 New Zealand Forest Products v O'Sullivan (1974] 2 NZLR 80 (SC). 
71 Collingwood v Home and Colonial Stores Limited (1936] 3 All ER 200 (HL (Eng). 
72 It is interesting to contrast the finding in Autex with results from Canada. In a remarkably similar fact 
scenarios, Canadian Courts have consistently rejected a claim to a non-natural use or an abnormal use 
for bulk conveyance of water in, see Tock v St John's Metropolitan Area Board (1989) 64 DLR (4th) 
620 (SCC); Ratko v Public Utility Commission of City of Woodstock (1994) 111 DLR (4th) 375 (Ont 
Divisional Ct); and Smith Eros Excavating Windsor Ltd v Price Waterhouse Ltd (1994) Ont CJ Lexis 
1486 (Ont SC). 
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different from risk, and negligence separates this inquiry. Therefore, the "critical 
obscurity" of the dual requirements is apparent in New Zealand. Incredible confusion 
arises from considering the duality of 'non-natural' and 'dangerous', and this flaws the 
application of the Rylands doctrine, rendering it susceptible to anomalous results. 
B Conclusion as to the Required Use of Land - 'Non-natural Use' 
The multitude of judicial epithets resulted in one New Zealand author resolving 
that the real question is "whether the risk of harm is so inherently great, even if all due 
care is taken, that neighbouring occupiers cannot reasonably be expected to accept it". 
73 
With due respect, that rationalisation is a far cry from that illustrated by Blackburn J or 
even Lord Cairns. In fact, it is a far cry from any understanding of the required test. The 
genuine concern is that focus concentrates on the extent of foreseeable harm, adequately 
covered by the foreseeability investigation carefully framed by Lord Goff in Cambridge 
Water. In essence, the above question results in the same inquiry being conducted twice: 
Is there an inherently risky activity? and is there the risk of damage upon escape? Same 
question, same answer. Most surely, that cannot be the correct approach; asking the same 
question twice seems ludicrous. The recent Court of Appeal cases largely excluded such 
considerations from their judgments, ignoring and evading the inherent complications of 
Rylands terminology. It appears as though they failed to recognise the problem. Given 
the likelihood that subsequent Courts will find 'non-natural use' too uncertain to apply, or 
be tempted to manipulate the requirements, the failure to define what land use meant 
highlights the flawed nature of the Rylands doctrine. Two options exist: simplify Rylands 
to its original position, or more realistically, import the inquiry into foreseeability and 
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proximity as per Burnie, and disregard the need for a determination as to use. In 
considering the modern conception of Rylands, the relative importance of the 
foreseeability inquiry should render the 'non-natural use' issue a simple matter. If 
Rylands applies, the original conception of the test should be the focus: that 'not naturally 
there'. The original test constitutes an incredibly simple investigation seeking to 
determine what was there, and what was introduced. No determination into the inherent 
nature of the use is necessary, for that is the domain of foreseeability. It is important to 
understand that the 'non-natural' factor never was the determinant for liability; it simply 
provided a criterion in order to be considered under the Rylands doctrine. The damage, 
and the foreseeability criteria are far more determinative of liability. Simply, nothing 
inherently special derives from the classification of Rylands as a separate doctrine. In 
fact, this author contends that the requirements of ordinary negligence, and further, the 
comprehensiveness of a foreseeability inquiry should more comprehensively answer these 
very Rylands questions. Inherent risks will suggest the imposition of a relevant and 
varied standard of care. The gap instigated by dangerous substances naturally on the land 
is incorporated within negligence liability, upon the proviso that the defendant adopted or 
failed to take reasonable care to remedy the risk of damage. 
74 Thus, a better approach to 
these concerns, arguably, is through negligence itself. 
C Question of Law or Fact? 
Amirthalingam contends that the majority failed to satisfactorily consider a crucial 
point identified by the minority. The argument concerns the determination that non-
73 John Smillie "The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher" in Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (3 
ed, Wellington, Brookers, 2001) 554. 
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natural use and dangerous substance are a question of law in Rylands, whereas the 
determination of foreseeability in negligence is a question of fact. 75 Brennan J connoted 
that this "seems to be of some importance".76 There is a three-fold response. First, 
judges, thus far, have struggled to identify a common thread in answering the question in 
law. Perhaps, it is time for the jury to complement or complete the fact-finding mission. 
Judges still retain jury direction in regards to legal definitions. Furthermore, Lord Porter 
in direct conflict with Brennan J's proposition, stated in Read v J Lyons that:77 
... each [ie the questions whether something 'is dangerous' and whether a ' use' is a 'non-
natural' one] seems to be a question of fact. .. 
Thus, it is doubtful whether the inquiry was the sole domain of a question of law. If 
anything, it had to be a mixed question of law and fact.
78 Secondly, the non-natural and 
dangerous investigation accords more easily with a factual inquiry. The reasonable 
person should easily determine what is or is not dangerous or non-natural. The majority 
also recognise that it is not possible to consider the inquiry as solely one of fact or law, 
but rather a combination. Thirdly, the minority's concern lacks significance when one 
considers the nature of the tort trial. Questions of law and fact are relevant, more so, to 
jury trials. Jury trials in tort are increasingly infrequent, thus, often the judge answers 
both questions of law and fact, and even if a jury trial occurred, the Judge retains control 
74 This derives from an application of Goldman v Hargraves [1967] l AC 645 (PC) and Sedleigh-Denfield v 
0 'Callaghan (Trustees for St Joseph 's Society for Foreign Missions) [1940] AC 880 (HL (Eng). 
75 Kumaralingam Amirthalingam " Strict Liability Restricted: A Critical Commentary on Burnie Port 
Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd' (1994) 13 (No 2) U ofTas L Rev 416,419. 
76 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 77 (HCA) Brennan J. 
77 Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [194 7] AC 156, 179 (HL (Eng) Lord Porter, quoted in Autex Industries Ltd v 
Auckland City Council [2000] NZAR 324, 328 (CA). 
78 Kumaralingam Amirthalingam "Strict Liability Restricted: A Critical Commentary on Burnie Port 
Authority v General Jones PtyLtd' (1994) 13 (No 2) U ofTas L Rev 416,419. As a Rylands inquiry, 
the majority also recognise that it was a mixed question of law and fact, see Burnie Port Authority v 
General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 54 (HCA). 
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over the jury's answer of fact by determining the applicable standard of care. Through 
choosing negligence, the majority embark on an analysis of 'non-natural use' as a 
question of fact. Thus, the negligence investigation as a question of fact seems to pose 
little of the problems as identified by the minority. In fact, the factual inquiry seems to 
constitute a natural inquiry. Arguably, the question of fact could provide a more 
appropriate and rational legal answer, and "[i]f the character of a use [becomes] a mere 
question of fact, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher would become another conquest in the 
imperial expansion of the law of negligence",79 then so be it. 
D Limitations to the Scope of the Rule 
The majority next considered the scope of the rule. They determined that 
progressively alterations, additions, explanations, and qualifications internally 'weakened 
and confined' 80 the application and scope of the Rylands rule.
81 While the majority 
focused on the controversial Read v Lyons decision,82 they should have considered New 
Zealand's case law to discover some interesting internal limitations concerning the scope 
of Rylands. Common farming practice uses fire to clear land and back burn. However, 
New Zealand's history is littered with examples of damage resulting from these fires to 
neighbour's person, property, and chattels. Three such cases are worth a mention, for 
they highlight the confused Rylands doctrine. In Russell v McCabe,
83 the appellant lit a 
fire on her property, which due to unfavourable windy and dry conditions escaped and 
79 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 77 (HCA) Brennan J. 
80 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 54 (HCA). 
81 J M Paterson "Rylands v Fletcher into Negligence: Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltcf' 
(1994) 20 Monash Uni L Rev 318, 319-320. 
82 Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] AC 156 (HL (Eng) incorporates an exceptional case-specific 
determination with little authoritative standing. Few cases, thankfully, have raised similar fact 
scenarios. 
8' "Russell v McCabe [1961] NZLR 392 (CA). 
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injured the respondent. Admittedly, the case was answered in the respondent's favour 
due to the negligent lighting of the fire. However, the Court mentioned that the use of 
fire to burn off potential fire hazards constituted a natural use of the land, irrespective of 
the escape; no definitive decision on Rylands was provided. In Eriksen v Clifton,
84 
McGregor J detailed that using fue to burn off gorse constituted a natural use of land, but 
that escape would render the use dangerous and non-natural. Consequently, the 
landowner would be liable if the fire was their responsibility. The landowner 
circumvented liability, as the independent contractor responsible for lighting the fue was 
only an invitee employed to inspect and decide whether there would be acceptance of the 
task. The landowner could only foresee the mere inspection, and not the fire lighting. 
85 
In New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v O 'Sullivan,86 Mahon J provided the interesting 
determination that burning off of vegetation in midsummer was a non-natural land use, 
but it may well be a natural use in other seasons of the year. These examples highlight 
the inadequate scope of the Rylands consideration. They clearly illustrate the problems 
associated with the ill-defined and variable concepts of Rylands, so often subject to 
manipulation. These concepts, in practice, are incredibly difficult to apply to factual 
scenarios, rendering the doctrine susceptible to unforeseeable and anomalous results. 
Interestingly, two out of the three cases found an answerable case in negligence. 
84 Eriksen v Clifton [1963] NZLR 705 (SC). 
85 Interestingly, however, even the application of the non-delegable duty from Burnie Port Authority v 
General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42 (HCA) would not apply for there was no expectation of 
contractual performance, as there was no contract. In essence, the true party responsible could only be 
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E Ignis Suus 
Technically, each of those cases (Russell, Eriksen, and O 'Sullivan) represented an 
easy determination for non-natural and dangerous use. Nevertheless, the cases provide 
excellent examples of the limitations of the scope of the rule. To incorporate ignis suus 
within Rylands, the doctrine is really stretched. While the factors of escape and 
foreseeability of damage are evident, there are difficulties with the 'non-natural use' 
inquiry. Recognition must accord that these cases are probably outside the original 
appreciation of 'collecting and keeping' for Rylands; there is no accumulation of a 
substance. In fact, the only rationale for determining that there has been a 'non-natural 
use' derives from the risk being so extreme. Simply, the ignis suus rule does not naturally 
fit within Rylands. The considerations of foreseeability, proximity, and a variable 
standard of care available within negligence comprehensively answer the ignis suus 
question. The fact that Rylands encompasses ignis suus provides a further factor 
favouring the adoption of negligence liability.
87 If Rylands is not incorporated into 
negligence, then, at the very least, the ignis suus doctrine must become part of the law of 
negligence. 
In reality, this entire discussion about the confusion and epithets introduced by the 
judiciary has left the doctrine near impossible to apply. Courts have seemingly forgotten 
the origins of the doctrine. Thus, time has come for New Zealand Courts to reconcile the 
true answer. Rylands no longer represents a separate doctrine; it leans too heavily on 
the third party that lit the fire. However, the case is illustrates the finding that the lighting of fire is a 
natural use of land. See the later discussion concerning non-delegable duties. 
86 New Zealand Forest Products v O 'Sullivan [1974] 2 NZLR 80 (SC). See discussion above. 
87 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 66 (HCA). 
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negligence concepts to determine any answer. The Court of Appeal in Hamilton 
recognised the idiocy of incorrectly labelling concepts, when Gault J states that:
88 
" . .. we do not understand the foreseeability requirement in negligence to be any 
different". 
Justice Gault explained that the foreseeability required for Rylands (as explained by Lord 
Goff in Cambridge Water) matches the foreseeability element included in negligence. 
This constitutes the first step on the path to ordinary negligence liability, a doctrine 
encompassing the potential to provide a better, succinct answer to damage arising from 
one-off damaging events. 
VII THE EXPANSION OF THE LAW OF ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE: 
FORESEEABILITY AND PROXIMITY 
The majority considered the continued expansion of the ordinary negligence 
doctrine,89 remarking that:90 
From without, ordinary negligence has progressively assumed dominion in the general 
territory of tortious liability for unintended physical damage, including the area in which 
the rule in Rylands v Fletcher once held sway. 
The general Rylands conception primarily encapsulates one-off, damaging events, which 
admittedly, accords closely with negligence and unintended damaging events. The 
distinction between the two, oddly, derives from the land-based nature of Rylands, 
88 Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2000] 1 NZLR 265, 284 (CA) Gault J. 
89 One important aspect highlighted was the decision of Lord Esher in Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 
503, which re-conceptualised the importance of foreseeability in negligence as a ' larger' proposition. 
It was from here that the majority concluded that the "coherent jurisprudence of common law 
negligence" began, see Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (l 994) 120 ALR 42, 55 (HCA). 
90 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 55 (HCA). 
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requiring an escape from the defendant's land damaging the plaintiffs land. Negligence 
has never been so limited, simply requiring the imposition of a duty of care based on 
foreseeability and proximity, a breach of that duty, and corresponding damage. In effect, 
the traditional distinction is the strict liability of Rylands, and the fault-based liability of 
negligence. 91 It is, without doubt, a gross exaggeration to conclude that Rylands 
constitutes a strict liability doctrine ( or absolute liability - in the New Zealand 
understanding, although perhaps this has too changed with the prominence of 
foreseeability). Even the "true rule of law" recognised that it was not a strict liability 
doctrine; the requirement of "anything likely to do mischief', coupled with the allowable 
excuses (Act of third person/God) indicate that the concept was, at the very least, initially, 
a stricter liability doctrine. It is accepted that foreseeability is the same for the two 
doctrines. In reality, any attempt to define foreseeability by degree, must include an 
implicit recognition that foreseeability possesses the same originating point. This is an 
essential consideration for two factors: First, the introduction of and reliance upon 
negligence concepts highlights the closeness of the two torts, and secondly, the 
artificialities included within Rylands indicates that these negligence concepts should 
provide a better legal answer when separated from the confines of Rylands. 
The majority commented on the increasing closeness of the doctrines. In 
identifying the key negligence elements (foreseeability and proximity), recognising the 
dominance of negligence law for unintentional injury to property or person, and 
conceptualising Rylands in a negligence sense, this allowed the majority to state that:
92 
91 As mentioned above, John G Fleming argued that this was the greatest loss from assuming Rylands into 
negligence, see John G Fleming "The Fall of the Crippled Giant" (1995) TLR 56. 
92 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) l 20 ALR 42, 56 (HCA). 
[T]he rule has been increasingly qualified and adjusted to reflect basic aspects of the law 
of ordinary negligence. 
A Proximity 
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Essential to any negligence discussion is the notion of relationship or proximity, 
although it is recognised that Australia has a chequered history in relation to this 
concept.93 Recently, the Australian approach has favoured a general reliance principle. 
Nevertheless, in Burnie the majority's discussion of proximity concentrated on its 
usefulness as an analytical tool, rather than as a definitive criterion. Mason CJ explicitly 
recognised this: 94 
It is true that the requirement of proximity was neither formulated by Lord Atkin
95 nor 
propounded and developed in cases in this court as a logical definition or complete 
criterion which could be directly applied as part of a formal syllogism of formal logic to 
the particular circumstances of a particular case. As a general conception . . . its practical 
utility lies essentially in understanding and identifying the categories of case in which a 
duty of care arises under the common law of negligence .. . 
It is submitted that this relationship factor, while similar to the Rylands inquiry is a more 
comprehensive and applicable test. In ignoring many of the Rylands artificialities, it is 
able to draw on an incredibly diverse precedent history. The importance of proximity as a 
general conception within negligence cannot be underestimated; Deane J in Stevens v 
Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd recognises that it is "the general conceptual determinant 
and that unifying theme of the categories of cases in which the common law of 
93 In fact, the most recent movements have shown a clear preference for "general reliance" and 
"vulnerability", for further information see Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Financing Committee 
(1999) l 67 ALR 1 (HCA), Pyranees Shire Council v Day (1998) 151 ALR 14 7 (HCA), and Sutherland 
Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 60 ALR 1 (HCA). 
94 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 56 (HCA). 
95 This references to the Lord Atkin's celebrated judgment in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL 
(Eng) which determined that proximity acts as form of qualification over the proposition of 
foreseeability as derived from Lord Esher in Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503. 
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negligence recognises the existence of a duty to take reasonable care".96 Thus, while not 
operating as comprehensive liability criterion, the use of proximity isolates the essential 
negligence theme of the crucial relationship (or the general reliance relationship), 
providing that necessary conceptual determinant sadly missing from Rylands. The 
Rylands relationship of an owner or occupier bringing and keeping dangerous substances 
and embarking on a non-natural use of land is very similar to situations where a 
'relationship of proximity' arises between the owner or occupier, and another whose 
property is at risk due to an escape.97 In its role as a general conception, proximity 
remains essential for consistency, operating in the background as conceptual 'glue', and 
not governing the tort. This contrasts to the requirement of 'non-natural use'. As a 
specific tortious element, it forms an aspect of the complex liability criterion, a unique 
inquiry for each case, so the introduction or retention of trees, water, gas, electricity, fire, 
and explosives has equally attracted or not attracted the operation of Rylands.
98 Sadly, 
this expression of principle has sourced incredible disunity and disparity within the tort. 
In essence, the Courts conclusion is a lottery; there is little surety regarding the Court's 
direction even with precedent authority. 
Thus, this author suggests that the notional underpinning of proximity within the 
law of negligence much better suits the questions posed by the Rylands doctrine. 
Importantly, proximity underpins, and does not govern. Standard proximity will suffice 
for the inquiry, as it applies naturally to such an inquiry. However, it will depend on the 
approach the Courts decide to adopt with respect to proximity. For completeness, 
% Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 31, 55 (HCA) per Deane J. 
97 Peter B Kutner The End of Rylands v Fletcher - II: Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1996) 
31 Tort & Ins LJ 663, 669. 
98 For one example see Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano Co [1921] 2 AC 465 (HL 
(Eng) and compare it with Readv J Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] AC 156 (HL (Eng). 
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Australian Courts recently moved away from proximity, towards the relationship of 
general reliance or vulnerability.99 The vulnerability notion poses no concern to the New 
Zealand Courts, essentially mirroring the scope of proximity. However, three aspects 
deserve notice. First, the categories of case adopting general reliance concern public 
liability or government liability cases, and reliance is accordingly an appropriate focus. 
Secondly, the courts are yet to decide if general reliance governs negligent injury to 
person or property. It seems doubtful that it would apply, for proximity better 
encapsulates the nature of damage claims; "that person so closely and directly affected". 
Thirdly, if general reliance were the determining factor, this approach would then differ 
markedly to New Zealand's approach to the relationship factor, and the appropriate 
understanding of proximity would have to be determined. Whether proximity, general 
reliance, the Anns two-stage test, or Caparo 's three-step approach should apply is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but certainly needs further investigation. The important 
conclusion is that proximity closely mirrors the Rylands investigation, but more 
succinctly encapsulates the concern. The operation of proximity is far more certain and 
applicable, and the removal of this consideration from the 'use' focus is a distinct benefit 
arising from the negligence approach. 
Interestingly, the Hamilton Court of Appeal accepted that water suppliers owed a 
general duty of care to the plaintiffs, but did not accept that they owed a specific duty of 
care due to the hydroponically grown tomatoes and the grower's reliance on pure water 
supplies. Importantly, there had been no representation or undertaking from the water 
99 See Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Financing Committee (1999) 167 ALR 1 (HCA), Pyranees Shire 
Council v Day (1998) 151 ALR 147 (HCA), and Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman {1985) 60 ALR 1 
(HCA). 
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supplies that they would take extra care. 100 However, it was easily acceptable that due to 
the proximity of the water supplier to the plaintiffs, and the likelihood of harm through 
negligently conducting their duties that a duty of care was owed. It would seem certain 
that the same duty would exist in Autex between the Council and the ratepayers. In fact, 
the closely analogous Canadian cases of Tock v St John's Metropolitan Area Board101 and 
Ratko v Public Utility Commission of City of Woodstock102 both held that the authorities 
owed duties of care to the ratepayers. However, both the Autex and Hamilton Courts 
failed to consider the best proximity approach. 
B Nuisance and Trespass 
The majority maintained that the rule reflected negligence irrespective of 
"parental claims" of nuisance or trespass. 103 This is undoubtedly a bold statement. 
Traditionally, "the true rule" of Rylands operated as a distinct strict liability doctrine, 
separate from negligence despite its continued infiltration. However, the High Court 
majority performed what no other major appeal Court was prepared to do. The majority, 
in reverting to first principles, asked what the rule really means. Contrastingly, the House 
of Lords definitively found that Rylands continues as a subset of nuisance. The greatest 
failure in that approach was simply that His Honour Lord Goff provided little explanation 
as to what necessitated the continuation of this particular doctrine, even within nuisance. 
100 Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2000] I NZLR 265, 281-282 (CA) Gault J. 101 Tock v St John's Metropolitan Area Board (1989) 64 DLR ( 4th) 620 (SCC). 
102 Ratko v Public Utility Commission of City of Woodstock (1994) 111 DLR (4th) 375 (Ont Divisional Ct). 103 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 57-58 (HCA). The majority 
identified a plethora of authority representing the ' parental claims' . For nuisance it included Rickards 
v Lothian [1913] AC 263 , 275 (PC) ; Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43 , 47, 49, 51 ; ReadvJ Lyons 
& Co Ltd [194 7] AC 156, 173, 182-183 (HL (Eng); Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249, 296-297, 
319-320; Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Leather Pie [1994] 2 AC 265 (HL (Eng), and one could 
include the New Zealand cases of Autex and Hamilton . For trespass the authorities included Foster v 
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The inclusion of the 'important' element of 'foreseeability', which differs from 
negligence foreseeability, can only be problematic. 104 One may boldly suggest that the 
House of Lords blatantly ignored the true state of the rule. 105 
C Strict Liability 
The celebrated academic, the late Professor Fleming, favoured the Rylands 
doctrine. He titled his commentary concerning Burnie and Cambridge Water as "the fall 
of the crippled giant". 106 With due respect, his predominant concern was the decline of 
the strict liability rationale, rather than more focused and detailed considerations of the 
implicit and explicit doctrinal flaws. Burnie has also been categorised as "another 
conquest in the imperial expansion of the law of negligence". 107 The strict liability 
question is worth pondering. The numerous exceptions to Rylands including the defences 
of 'consent' and 'default of the plaintiff prompted the celebrated academic, the late 
Professor Fleming to comment that: 108 
[T]he aggregate effect of these exceptions makes it doubtful whether there is much left of 
the rationale of strict liability as originally contemplated in 1866. 
Warblington Urban Council [1906] 1 KB 648, 672; Jones v Llanrwst Urban Council [1911] 1 Ch 393, 
402-403 (HC); and Hoare & Co v McAlpine [1923] 1 Ch 167, 175 (HC). 
104 See Gault J in Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2000] 1 NZLR 265, 284 (CA), where 
foreseeability cannot differ from the negligence standard. 
105 The Canadian approach is somewhat confusing, with nuisance providing the most common answer. 
However, all three torts tend to be applied. Often the criteria are intertwined, rendering many of the 
decisions confusion and difficult to apply. 
106 John G Fleming "The Fall of the Crippled Giant" (1995) TLR 56. 
107 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 77 (HCA) per Brennan J, and Jane 
Swanton "Case Note: 'Another Conquest in the Imperial Expansion of the Law of Negligence': Burnie 
Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd' (1994) 2 TLJ 1. 
108 John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9 ed, 1998, Sydney, Law Book Company) 385. 
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The Professor explained that the effect of these defences equates to "almost complet[ing] 
the circle of. .. negligence liability". 109 Fleming states 'almost completing' in relation to 
the defences alone. However, the combination of the application of negligence criteria, 
the similarity of the foreseeability requirement, and the closeness of the defences, this 
circle should now be completed. In effect, Rylands increasingly reflects negligence. The 
majority's position is therefore warranted, for it accounts for the true conceptual 
similarity of the torts. 110 
Pardy discusses the idealism of a strict, no-fault regime, while recognising the 
gradual erosion by fault-based torts. 111 Thus while it is arguably ideal that defendants 
bear the full cost for carrying on harmful activities, negligence requires cost-
responsibility for carelessly conducted activities. 112 Subsuming Rylands liability into 
negligence ignores the traditional strict liability conception, as negligence requires and 
demands the breach of the duty owed by the defendant. One benefit is that negligence 
encourages careful behaviour, for any carelessness will be punished; strict liability on the 
other hand, provides few incentives to monitor behaviour, as an individual is liable 
irrespective of precautions taken or care exercised. 113 The strict liability argument is 
easily criticised. First, it is simply incorrect (emphasised throughout this paper) to 
suggest that Rylands remains strict. However, it would be unwise to ignore the 
traditional, 'ideal' position. Simply, Blackbum J's original decision probably implements 
a strict liability standard, but Lord Cairn ' s distortions no longer rendered the ' true rule ' 
truly strict. One important historical realisation is that these torts (negligence, nuisance, 
109 John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9 ed, 1998, Sydney, Law Book Company) 385. 
110 See Fleming and Pollock above, footnotes I 0, 11 , and 103. 
111 Bruce Pardy "Fault and Cause: Rethinking the Role ofNegligent Conduct" (1995) TLR 143. 
112 Bruce Pardy "Fault and Cause: Rethinking the Role of Negligent Conduct" (1995) TLR 143, 144. 
113 Bruce Pardy "Fault and Cause: Rethinking the Role of Negligent Conduct" (1995) TLR 143, 144-145. 
34 
and Rylands) derive from the writ of action on the case. 114 This common root prompted 
Pardy to suggest that the elimination of these distinctions would make render this area 
conceptually sound.u 5 Oliver Wendell Holmes commented that foreseeability of the 
likelihood of harm was the unifying element of tortious liability, and in particular, this 
triumvirate of negligence, nuisance, Rylands. 116 Pardy was concerned by the fact that no 
Court had expressed a principle that sensibly and manifestly governs this liability; 
although he noted that the Burnie majority and the Cambridge House of Lords indicate 
attempts at such rationalisation. 117 Perhaps the underlying antithesis would be 
constrained for the persistent introduction and adoption of negligent criteria highlights 
that negligence continues to assume dominance in this complete area of liability. Leaving 
nuisance aside from this consideration, in applying negligence standards to this area New 
Zealand, in following Australia, would accord with Roman law jurisdictions. For 
example, South Africa and Scotland successfully operate a fault-based conception for this 
harm caused by the escape of controlled substances. 11 8 Therefore, although the direction 
chosen by the High Court is novel and bold, it is certainly not unprincipled or legally 
incorrect. The precedent and rationale exist for a New Zealand Court to at least consider 
the correct approach to Rylands , rather than simply concluding that it is a subset of 
nuisance, and failing to consider the options. 
114 Bruce Pardy "Fault and Cause: Rethinking the Role of Negligent Conduct" (1995) TLR 143, 157. 
115 Bruce Pardy "Fault and Cause: Rethinking the Role of Negligent Conduct" (1995) TLR 143, 157. 
ll
6 Oliver Wendell Holmes The Common Law (1882) Lectures III and IV. 
11 7 Bruce Pardy "Fault and Cause: Rethinking the Role of Negligent Conduct" (1995) TLR 143, 157. 
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D Defences 
The minority targeted defences as a key dissenting factor. McHugh J's arguments 
included that Rylands defences apply to causation and not to the denial or reduction of 
liability as in negligence; that no contributory negligence concept is available in Rylands; 
and that negligence incorporation will result in the reduction of liability calculated on the 
extent of the contributing fault. 119 With due respect, McHugh J ignores the important role 
within negligence of causation; little difference will actually result. Simply, the 
plaintiff's default can only be equated with contributory negligence. Professor Fleming 
confidently reconciles the two with each other, and recognises that the plaintiff's default 
reduces damages in the contributory negligence sense. 120 McHugh's stance is 
unsubstantiated, and contrasts to the plentiful authority supporting the contributory 
negligence approach. 121 Legal principle demands that risks created by one must be 
balanced against those taken by the other; justice requires equity of treatment and each 
person's contribution should be considered appropriately. Fleming's opinion suggests 
that causation is not the predominant focus of the Rylands defences. With respect, 
McHugh J overstates the concern. Rather, it provides another rationale for negligence 
subsuming Rylands, harmonising and simplifying the inquiry. 
The obvious question concerns whether these trends are detectable in New 
Zealand. No question surrounds the 'mischievous' aspect, as Gault J explicitly agrees 
that negligence foreseeability must accord with Lord Goff's standard. Simply, the 
various conceptions of Rylands defences correspond strongly "with the grounds of denial 
118 Jeannie Marie Paterson "Rylands v Fletcher into Negligence: Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty 
Ltd" (I 994) 20 Monash Uni L Rev (No 2) 317, 323. 
119 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 93 (HCA) per McHugh J. 
120 John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9 ed, 1998, Sydney, Law Book Company) 387. 
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of fault of liability under the law of negligence". 122 While some desire that Rylands 
remains 'strict', in essence, it never was, and certainly would be nigh near impossible to 
now apply. The defences, while not necessarily examined by the New Zealand Courts, 
are arguably irrefutably similar to negligence. It is with some amusement that one reads 
comments made by the Court and commentator alike. Smillie considers the application 
of the act of God defence, noting that it only applies to "freakishly rare" occurrences not 
considered to be even a remote possibility. 123 Interestingly, Smillie considers the House 
of Lords case of Greenock Corp v Caledonian Railway Co in considering the application 
of the Act of God defence. The test considered was "whether human foresight and 
prudence could recognise the possibility of such an occurrence". 124 This clear negligence 
language is intimately similar to the negligence approach to third party interference. One 
comment boldly states that "since liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher remains 
strict and is not dependent on lack of reasonable care ... the defence of contributory 
negligence has no application". 125 A 1902 New Zealand case supported this proposition, 
and McHugh provided the authoritative evidence for this claim. Simply, the playing field 
for Rylands has changed. While the original premise may have anticipated 'stricter' 
liability, judicial alterations and qualifications render such a claim laughable. Therefore, 
the trends identified by the High Court of Australia equally apply in ew Zealand. Once 
again, the apparent difference is that the Australian Court questioned Rylands, while ew 
121 Dunn v Birmingham Canal Co (1872) LR 7 QB 244; Eastern & S African Telegraph v Cape Town 
Tramways [1902] AC 381 (PC); and Martins v Hotel Mayfair [1976] 2 NSWLR 15 (SC). 
122 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 58 (HCA). 
123 John Smillie "The rule in Rylands v Fletcher" in Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (3 
ed, Wellington, Brookers, 2001) 556. 
124 Greenock Corp v Caledonian Railway Co [1917] AC 556 (HL (Eng). The sole case with a successful 
Act of God defence was Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 Ex D 1. 
125 John Smillie "The rule in Rylands v Fletcher" in Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (3 
ed, Wellington, Brookers, 2001) 555. 
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Zealand Courts blindly follow history and the 'mother' jurisdiction without pondering the 
implications of doing so; someone has to ask why. 
E The Implications o/Hunter v Canary Wharf 
The potential repercussion that the decision in Hunter v Canary Wharf may have 
on Rylands is the most concerning aspect in placing Rylands as a subset of nuisance. This 
concerns both New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The judgment's consideration of 
standing to sue potentially has far-reaching implications. While Hunter remains to be 
considered in New Zealand, only a brave Court would fail to follow Lord Goff's 
persuasively argued majority judgment, although Lord Cooke provides an excellent and 
persuasive dissenting judgement. The House of Lords held that the governing standing 
consideration is exclusivity of possession, essentially comprising the fee simple estate 
owner, leasehold owner, and potentially, a reversionary interest holder. Thus, in calling 
Rylands an aspect of nuisance, this controlling proposition applies. However, it extends 
even further, in that not only must the plaintiff have exclusive possession, but so must the 
defendant. 126 The paramount consideration in nuisance is to strike a balance between the 
two competing property interests of neighbours. 127 It necessarily follows that if one holds 
exclusive possession then so must the other, or those property interests would not be on 
equal footing. Conceptually, this is an immense change to the Rylands doctrine; one 
would warn that such change requires careful consideration. Rylands has and never was 
so arbitrarily limited in application. Even Blackburn J's pronouncement of "his land" for 
the defendant was not so stringently interpreted as to require a strong possessory interest. 
126 Lord Goff would probably favour the exclusive possession approach for the plaintiff, as this follows the 
property damage focus in Cambridge Water. 
127 John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9 ed, 1998, Sydney, Law Book Company) 467. 
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In fact, a simple occupational interest continues to be the concern. This represents a 
change of some magnitude, potentially operating as a further ad hoe limitation on 
recovery. It seems grossly unjust for a plaintiff to establish all circumscribing criteria for 
the claim to fail simply due to the defendant holding an insufficient property interest. 
One can foresee the idiocy of a defendant simply pleading insufficient title ( operating as a 
further 'defence'). The plaintiff affected is also adjudged by their possessory interest in 
land. This seems entirely unprincipled. Rylands compensation is recoverable for all 
damage that is the natural, foreseeable consequence of the escape; there is no express or 
inherent restriction on who may sue. The relative importance of Hunter for nuisance, 
coupled with associating Rylands as a division of nuisance, leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that the principles established in Hunter infiltrate and control the operation of 
Rylands. In shifting Rylands into negligence, the arbitrariness of possessory interest 
requirements is replaced with more flexible notions of proximity and the neighbour 
principle. Plaintiffs can more easily establish a prima facie case, simply demonstrating 
Lord Atkin's hypothesis of 'that person': 128 
so closely and directly affected by my acts . . . that one ought reasonably to think of them. 
Negligence will better avoid the complications of the nuisance/ Rylands inquiry, including 
the wholly unnecessary requirement for such a strict possession standard for the 
defendant. In collecting and keeping substances likely to harm upon escape, there 
appears little value in governing liability by some antiquated notion of exclusive 
128 Donoghue v Stevenson (1932] AC 562 (HL (Eng) Lord Atkin. 
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possessory interests. In essence, the closeness of nuisance and Rylands creates immense 
difficulties, and thus, negligence best avoids such arbitrary and unnecessary distinctions. 
VIII RECOVERABLE DAMAGES 
The consideration of recoverable damages available under Rylands represented an 
integral aspect of the majority's judgment. The two competing answers included 
maintaining Rylands within the land-based scope of allowable damages, or aligning 
Rylands with negligence to incorporate a wider scope of damages not based on land 
ownership. Cambridge Water clearly confined recoverable damages in England to 
compensation for damage to property sustained by the owner or occupier of neighbouring 
land. 129 The leading case cited was Read v Lyons, where a shell explosion on the 
defendant's land caused great personal injury to plaintiff. In a strict legal decision, the 
escape factor was determinant, but unfortunately little discussion considered whether 
personal injury claims could succeed under Rylands. Traditionally, negligence operates 
to remedy unintentional personal injury. Conceptually, a nuisance claim only recognises 
damage to the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the land, but that was seemingly not 
enforced in Read v Lyons. 130 
The Australian position is far less confined. Windeyer J' s judgment in Benning v 
Wong, extended damages under Rylands to cover both personal injury or damage to 
property sustained by the escape from the defendant's land in circumstances where the 
plaintiff has no relationship to the neighbouring land apart from being on that land at that 
129 In fact, that was arguably the determining factor in Read v J Lyons &Co Ltd [1945] AC 156 (HL (Eng) 
where the Court focused on the fact that injury occurred on the defendant's premises, and thus, there 
was no escape, as was necessary. Some doubt exists in England however, as Perry v Kendrick 's 
Transport Ltd [1956] 1 All ER 154; 1 WLR 85 (CA) clearly postulates wider damages than just injury 
to property affected by an escape. 
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time.
131 
Obviously, a wider conception of recoverable damages exists in Australia, and 
although it was necessary to meet the other requirements of the rule, this concept of the 
tort is more akin to negligence. The High Court of Australia reconciled that the main 
control of recoverable damages, "damage which is the natural consequence of [the] 
escape", 
132 
closely paralleled foreseeability for actionable damages within negligence. 
Wagon Mound (No 1) details that damage suffered must be foreseeable. 133 Lord Goffs 
inclusion of foreseeability of damage dramatically changed the English approach, and in 
effect, the practicalities of the Cambridge Water result could be the same as Burnie. 134 It 
certainly brings negligence and Rylands closer. Lord Goff commented that he "did not 
consider that [the defendant] should be under any greater liability than that imposed for 
negligence". 135 Perhaps the best summary of the approach chosen by the High Court is 
encapsulated in the phrase, "Let us call a spade a spade" .136 
Arguably, New Zealand's damages position is similar to Australia. A telling 
signal is the Court of Appeal's reference to the case of Benning v Wong in Mayfair Ltd v 
Pears. 137 Although the case was not decided in a Rylands sense, referring to intentional 
torts, the Court clearly, but briefly, acknowledged and accepted the case's approach. 138 
The case's focus on the recoverability of damages therefore strengthens the claim that 
New Zealand's conception of Rylands should align with Australia's approach, despite the 
130 It is to be remembered that Lord Macmillan believed that negligence should have been pleaded. 
131 Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249, 274-275, 277, and especially 319-320, per Windeyer J. 
132 Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Ex 265, 279 per Blackburn J. 
133 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Marts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) [1961] 1 All 
ER404 (PC). 
134 John G Fleming "The Fall of the Crippled Giant" (1995) TLR 56, 56-57. 
135 Cambridge Water Co Ltdv Eastern Counties Leather Pie [1994] 2 AC 264,281; l All ER 53, 77 (HL 
(Eng) Lord Goff. 
136 Kumaralingam Amirthalingam "Strict Liability Restricted: A Critical Commentary on Burnie Port 
Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd' (1994) 13 (No 2) U ofTas L Rev 416,427. 
137 Mayfair Ltd v Pears [1987) 1 NZLR 459 (CA). 
138 Mayfair Ltdv Pears [1987) 1 NZLR 459, 471 (CA) per Somers J. 
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statements of the Court of Appeal. The fact that the Courts in Autex and Hamilton failed 
to provide any specific statements as to the types of recoverable damages is noteworthy. 
One would certainly understand that such an inquiry would form part of the calculation as 
to which is the most appropriate tort. However, the New Zealand position will differ for 
one key factor. The Accident Compensation personal injury scheme rules out any 
decision in respect of personal injury. 139 The Courts will not consider it, due to ACC's 
exclusive control of personal injury. 
On a first principles approach (in the absence of ACC), there appears no rational 
reason as to why personal injury damages could not be recovered. Professor Fleming 
criticises Lord Macmillan's position in Read v Lyons that argued that Rylands could never 
support a personal injury claim. Fleming describes this as unprincipled and unsupported 
(both then and now), and then proceeds to identify a number of distinct Rylands cases 
concerning physical injury, 140 including Perry v Kendrick 's Transport, 141 and the 
Canadian case of Aldridge v Van Patter. 142 Few valid reasons detail why New Zealand 
Courts could not allow a claim for personal injury (in ACC's absence). First, Blackburn 
J' s doctrine provides that the defendant is "answerable for all the damage which is the 
natural consequence of its escape". 143 Thus, it seems unduly arbitrary to deny recovery 
for natural personal injury simply because it is not property damage. Secondly, it is 
possible to recover economic losses under the Rylands doctrine, although the method 
closely aligns with the negligence approach. 144 The wider the scope of available 
damages, the closer Rylands is to negligence. Not only do qualifying criteria for liability 
139 Accident Insurance Act 1998, s 394. 
140 John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9 ed, 1998, Sydney, Law Book Company) 384. 
141 Perry v Kendrick's Transport (1956] 1 WLR 85, 92 (CA) Parker LJ. 
142 Aldridge v Van Patter [1952] 4 DLR 93 (Ont HC). 
143 Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR I Ex 265,280 (Ex Ch) Blackbum J. 
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parallel negligence, so does the extent of recoverability. ACC is an important 
consideration, but on its own, it cannot prevent the incorporation of Rylands into 
negligence. 145 
IX CONCLUSION AS TO NEGLIGENCE AND DAMAGE 
New Zealand, much like England, refuses to question Rylands, while increasingly 
aligning Rylands more closely with negligence in the relevant aspects of the test, and 
simultaneously rendering it as a nuisance sub-set. Professor Fleming criticises the House 
of Lords for its decision in Cambridge Water, stating that: 146 
"The Court did not, however, expressly question the precedential authority of Rylands v 
Fletcher itself, merely its message of strict liability. In doing so, it followed a long and 
well trodden path of qualifying its scope and stripping away its no-fault characteristics". 
New Zealand's Court of Appeal is equally guilty. In a much-anticipated opportunity for 
true judicial consideration, there was a complete failure. They accepted the status quo, 
adopted, and altered some confusing developments, and, in effect, ignored the true 
question posed. In Hamilton v Papakura District Council, the Court attempted to 
rationalise the 'strictness' of Rylands by indicating that it is strict liability, as negligence 
need not be proved. However, the obvious concern with such a statement is that the 
elements essential for Rylands liability include numerous negligence considerations. 
Foreseeability obviously requires discussion; not only does it play an integral role in 
determining whether a use is non-natural, it is determinative whether 'dangerousness' 
arises (inherent danger), and it is decisive in whether the damage needs remedying (was 
144 John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9 ed, 1998, Sydney, Law Book Company) 384-385. 
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it foreseeable?). Courts and commentators alike must realise the true nature of the tort. 
Rylands is so closely intertwined in negligence that it is submitted that they cannot be 
separated. 
Importantly, as the majority appreciates, the Rylands rule "has never been seen as 
exclusively governing the liability of an occupier of land in respect of injury caused by 
the escape of a dangerous substance". 147 Statute law, negligence, trespass, and nuisance 
all operate in this realm. Empress Car Co 148 is a clear example of the statutory influence; 
New Zealand's Resource Management Act 1991 similarly plays an extensive role in 
controlling this area. One integral provision includes s 9(4) ' s definition of 'use ', which 
could encompass 'brings on to his lands and collects and keeps there' .149 Negligence 
controls a wider scope and variety of situations, unquestionably holding sway in personal 
injury and property damage circumstances. Furthermore, a plethora of examples 
highlight that nuisance often answers questions concerning one-off damaging events, 
supposedly the thesis of Rylands, including Sedleigh-Denfield v O 'Callaghan. 150 
Essentially, Rylands fails to operate as a separate doctrine, borrowing heavily from other 
torts, and this applies in New Zealand. The development of the modern law of negligence 
led the majority of the High Court of Australia to conclude that ordinary negligence has 
"encompassed and overlain the territory in which the rule in Rylands v Fletcher 
145 Negligence would still cover a wider area of property damage than current recoverability, and that is 
favourable. 
146 John G Fleming The Fall of a Crippled Giant (1995) TLR 56, 58 . 
147 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 59 (HCA). 
148 Empress Car Co (Abertille,y) Ltd v National Rivers Authority (1999] 2 AC 22 (HL). (1999] 2 AC 22 
(HL (Eng). 
149 Hinde, McMorland, and Sim Butterworths Land Law in New Zealand (1997, Wellington, Butterworths) 
908-909, see Resource Management Act 1991 , s 9(4). 
150 Sedleigh-Denfield v O 'Callaghan (Trustees for St Joseph 's Society for Foreign Missions) (1940] AC 880 
(HL (Eng). 
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operates" .
151 
This is highlighted two-fold: First, the predominance and importance of 
negligence factors in the Rylands test, and secondly by the exponential increase in 
negligence cases concerning one-off damaging events. The key Rylands notions will 
"inevitably fall within" principles of ordinary negligence and the 'relationship of 
proximity' determines the conceptual 'neighbour'. Certainly, it would be unusual for 
Rylands to exist sans negligence, but it is not entirely inconceivable (see Autex). 
These considerations seemingly balance in favour of applying negligence liability. 
In recognising the past adjustments and qualifications to Rylands, the majority contended 
that it would be increasingly difficult to render a judgment in Rylands where that liability 
did not exist under ordinary negligence. The majority combine both non-delegable duties 
of care and variable standards of care to conclude that it is wholly unlikely that a case 
decided in Rylands could not be decided in negligence. In essence, one could argue that 
with the variable standard of care alone, few cases would not be ' caught' by negligence. 
The majority state that on close examination of cases establishing Rylands sans 
negligence, they constitute invalid examples due to the continued development of the law 
of negligence. While accepting the majority ' s position, there is inadequate space for 
consideration of those few cases. The majority qualify their negligence proposition, by 
indicating that in certain circumstances there may remain cases in which it is preferable to 
ground liability in nuisance or trespass; an acceptable allowance given the increasing 
alignment of these torts. An element of intentional entry or direction indicates trespass, 
while interference without physical damage or exclusive possession of the defendant and 
plaintiff might support invoking nuisance. 
15 1 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (I 994) 120 ALR 42, 59 (HCA). 
Perhaps the most effective and telling summary of this position is: 152 
We have virtually reached the position where a defendant will not be considered liable 
when he would not be liable according to the ordinary principles of negligence. 
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This position exists in New Zealand, for the Court of Appeal's direction, while 
supposedly aligning the Court closely to the English nuisance position they closely 
associate the doctrine with negligence. It is simply incorrect to label the current direction 
as upholding Rylands within a nuisance rationale, when the very tests that determine 
liability demand and apply a negligence standard of behaviour. The role of foreseeability, 
the applicability of the proximity inquiry, the similarity of the defences, and the 
increasing dominion of negligence all operate to limit the possibility of establishing 
Rylands without negligence. However, it is important to recognise the residual categories 
where nuisance or trespass could apply in appropriate cases. 153 
A Variable Standard of Care 
The Burnie majority considered the role of variable standards of care within 
negligence. This is a pertinent consideration as it introduces implicit flexibility in 
determining breaches of the duty of care. This is a beneficial inclusion as it accords with 
some of the strictness of liability associated with Rylands, renderirig it very rare for 
Rylands to exist without negligence. The variable standard of care has a great degree of 
attractiveness, for "the standard of care exacted ... necessarily varies with the risk 
involved and that the risk involved includes both the magnitude of the risk ... and the 
152 Rogers (ed) Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (13 ed, London, Street & Maxwell Ltd, 1989) 443 . 
153 See Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 57-58 (HCA), and Autex 
Industries Ltd v Auckland City Council [2000] NZAR 324, 335 (CA) Keith and Blanchard JJ. 
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seriousness of the potential damage if an accident should occur". 154 It is worth noting that 
Thompson v Bankstown Corp, which establishes this variable standard, was accepted in 
New Zealand. 155 
The Rylands categorisations of 'non-natural', 'special', or 'dangerous substances 
likely to do harm' necessarily imports the test of the reasonable prudent person in the 
circumstances. One must recognise that the greater the likely resulting harm, the higher 
the standard of care expected. Responsibility for dangerous substances would require a 
reasonably prudent person to exercise a higher degree of care. Accordingly, this variable 
standard of care, depending on the magnitude of the danger, could result in "a degree of 
diligence so stringent as to amount practically to a guarantee of safety". 156 Therefore, the 
extreme danger posed by Isolite coupled with welding in the near vicinity, rendered it 
necessary to heighten the requisite standard of care. 
B Non-delegable Duties 
In concluding that Burnie Port Authority was liable for the negligence of the 
independent contractor, the majority imposed a non-delegable duty of care. Without 
proposing to consider non-delegable duties in great detail, it is necessary to briefly allude 
to the discussion. Non-delegable duties apply in situations where defendants cannot 
acquit themselves of the responsibility to exercise reasonable care by entrusting the work 
to a contractor. 157 The duties are not without controversy, and perhaps it is unfortunate 
that such an important case combined both Rylands and non-delegable duties. However, 
154 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 65 (HCA). The principle derives 
from the case of Thompson v Bankstown Corp (1953) 87 CLR 619,645. 
155 See McCarthy v Wellington City (1966) NZLR 481 (CA), and Heard v New Zealand Forest Products 
Ltd (1960) NZLR 329 (CA). 
156 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42, 65 (HCA). 
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this is not a criticism of the majority, for their answer is seemingly correct. The unique 
fact scenario of Burnie involved negligent welding by the independent contractor. The 
leading Australian case concerning the criteria for non-delegable duties is Kandis v State 
Transport Authority. 158 Mason J, in a meticulously argued judgment, described that 
generally, the determinant159 
element in the relationship between the parties which generates [the] responsibility or 
duty to see that care is taken is that the person on whom [the duty] is imposed has 
undertaken the care, supervision or control of the person or property of another or is so 
placed in relation to that person or his property as to assume a particular responsibility for 
his or its safety, in circumstances where the person affected might reasonably expect that 
due care will be exercised. 
The Burnie Port Authority exercised this control element by selecting the contractor, 
regulating its activity, controlling access, and at all times, possessing knowledge of the 
activities being completed, supervising this process, and authorising the work. Finally, it 
is noteworthy that non-delegable duties are not uncommon, nor foreign, to New Zealand. 
In fact, one of the key cases considered by Mason Jin Kandis was the New Zealand case 
of Mt Albert Borough Council v Johnson, 160 which considered a complicated fact 
discussion of an owner-cum-builder, and an independent contractor, with a subsequent 
subsidence of the property due to negligently constructed foundations. Thus, non-
delegable duties, in an appropriate case, are a useful instrument. 
157 John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9 ed, 1998, Sydney, Law Book Company) 435. 
158 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. 
159 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672, 687, per Mason J. 
160 Mt Albert Borough Council v Johnson [1979] 2 NZLR 234 (CA) 
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C Increased Fluidity of Law 
It is contended that subsuming Rylands into negligence introduces necessary 
fluidity into this area of law. The partition of negligence, nuisance, Rylands, and trespass 
involved unnecessary and undesirable competition and confusion. Common law fluidity 
should be cherished and sought-after. In reconciling that nuisance is the governing head 
of liability, and Rylands is a subset, Lord Goff in Cambridge Water chose to ignore the 
immense complications encompassed in Rylands, complicating rather than solving the 
problems. 161 Nuisance, generally, only applies to instances continuing discomfort, and 
one-off damaging events, traditionally, was outside its scope. It seems irrational to place 
Rylands into the ill-fitting nuisance, when negligence is more appropriate. While 
foreseeability is an element of both, the Hunter decision drastically limits the applicable 
scope, and it is clear that available damages in nuisance will not remedy physical damage. 
Thus, the acceptance of negligence will negate many of the uncertainties and 
idiosyncrasies of Rylands; negligence (in this particular field) operates as a more coherent 
scheme. One must remember that it was doubtful that Blackburn J established Ry lands as 
a separate doctrine, with the favoured approach recognising that it was presented within 
the principles of nuisance. However, one must recognise that the common law is not 
static, and the law should change as the principles change. Rylands sits awkwardly (to 
say the least) as a subset of nuisance - the continual introduction and application of 
negligence criteria increasingly renders the two doctrines indistinguishable. The common 
sense approach, and the jurisprudentially justified decision, is to absorb Rylands into 
negligence. 
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X APPLICATION TO THE RECENT NEW ZEALAND CASES 
Neither Autex nor Hamilton actually established liability, although the Autex 
minority were prepared to enter summary judgment. In both cases, the relationship of the 
regional or district council in the provision of water supplies would easily lead to the 
imposition of a duty of care. Water supply is an essential service; its negligent supply 
could foreseeably cause damage to many affected parties. The real question concerns the 
breach of the duty of care. In Autex, there is insufficient evidence to provide an answer, 
but if evidence existed regarding insufficient or ignored maintenance, then certainly a 
breach would be established. However, if no such evidence was identifiable then there 
probably is no negligence. It would only take a small factual modification to establish 
negligence. A representation to the affected party, or a failure to remedy a fault would 
found negligence However, due to the exclusive possession rights, it is duly submitted 
that Autex fits into the residual nuisance category, and thus, the Canadian nuisance 
approach in Tock162 and Ratko163 should be adopted and applied. These cases accept that 
a negligence duty of care is owed, that Rylands fails to provide an appropriate answer, 
and that nuisance succinctly covers this Council water escape situation. This is not an 
indication that negligence is an incorrect approach, but rather that the escape of bulk 
conveyances of water, supplied by councils is better considered under nuisance. 
In Hamilton, both negligence and Rylands were unfounded. The extensive factual 
inquiry suggests that a slight factual adjustment concerning foreseeabi lity or the 
concentration levels of the herbicide would ground negligence liability. Essentially, the 
16 1 In fact, Lord Goff's ' introduction' of, or focus on, the foreseeability element for Rylands increases the 
conceptual confusion underpinning the doctrine. 
162 Tock v St John 's Metropolitan Area Board ( 1989) 64 DLR ( 4th) 620 (SCC). 
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introduction of a damaging herbicide into the water supply accords closely with a 
negligence approach. Negligence provides the better method to this claim. 
The fact of no negligence in both cases could be disconcerting. However, this 
author is rather encouraged for negligence provides the same answer as Rylands, but 
through a better investigation. The imposition of duty of care represents one step in a 
better direction, and slight factual alterations would ground liability in negligence. 
To conclude, negligence succinctly and aptly rationalises the position that Rylands 
occupies. It is submitted that the wider application of negligence and the greater certainty 
accompanying the tort, will provide a better, more reasoned legal answer. The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal should stop being such a 'nuisance' and follow the lead 
indicated by the Burnie majority. Negligence should subsume Rylands v Fletcher. 
163 Ratko v Public Utility Commission of City of Woodstock (1994) 111 DLR (4th) 375 (Ont Divisional Ct). 
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